Data-driven techniques are used in cyber-physical systems (CPS) for controlling autonomous vehicles, handling demand responses for energy management, and modeling human physiology for medical devices. ese data-driven techniques extract models from training data, where their performance is o en analyzed with respect to random errors in the training data. However, if the training data is maliciously altered by a ackers, the e ect of these a acks on the learning algorithms underpinning data-driven CPS have yet to be considered. In this paper, we analyze the resilience of classi cation algorithms to training data a acks. Speci cally, a generic metric is proposed that is tailored to measure resilience of classi cation algorithms with respect to worst-case tampering of the training data. Using the metric, we show that traditional linear classi cation algorithms are resilient under restricted conditions. To overcome these limitations, we propose a linear classi cation algorithm with a majority constraint and prove that it is strictly more resilient than the traditional algorithms. Evaluations on both synthetic data and a real-world retrospective arrhythmia medical case-study show that the traditional algorithms are vulnerable to tampered training data, whereas the proposed algorithm is more resilient (as measured by worst-case tampering).
INTRODUCTION
e penetration of data-driven techniques (e.g., machine learning) to monitor and control a broad range of cyber-physical systems has sharply increased. Autonomous cars rely on visual object detectors learned from image data for recognizing objects [12, 25, 30] . Building demand response can be e ectively handled by data-driven modeling and prediction of the electric usage of buildings [33] . Smart insulin pumps can adapt to type 1 diabetic patients using data-driven modeling of user-speci c eating and pump-using behavior [13] . While data-driven CPS o er remarkable capabilities for enhanced performance, they also introduce unprecedented security vulnerabilities with the risk of malicious a acks having catastrophic consequences. Speci cally, the training data used for learning (be it online or o ine), is vulnerable to malicious tampering that can result in data-driven CPS reacting incorrectly to safety-critical events. e training data for data-driven CPS can be tampered in several ways, depending on the application. In modern automobiles, multiple vulnerabilities have been demonstrated where hackers obtain full control of automobiles by eavesdropping a Controller Area Network (CAN) and injecting CAN messages [11, 29] , which provides possibilities to inject malicious data being used for online learning algorithms [12, 25] . Furthermore, automobiles and robots, which rely on sensor inputs from global positioning system (GPS), inertial measurement unit (IMU) or wheel speed sensors, can be susceptible on spoo ng a acks [26, 43, 45] . is means a ackers can tamper training data collected from sensors. Hacking incidents on medical devices and hospitals [1] [2] [3] suggest a ackers can tamper both device-level and data center-level training data. Moreover, a ackers with knowledge of the underlying machine learning techniquese.g., support vector machines (SVMs), principal component analysis, logistic regression, arti cial neural network, and (ensemble) decision trees -can strategically alter the training data to minimize the accuracy of the algorithms [6, 7, 23, 27, 34, 46] , to maliciously a ect the performance of data-driven CPS [12, 13, 25, 33, 39, 42, 48] .
Capabilities provided by traditional cyber defenses (e.g., communication channel encryption and authentication), fault tolerant techniques (e.g., data sanitization [16] , robust loss functions [51, 53] , and robust learning [14, 20] ), and adversarial learning [9, 17, 19] are necessary to secure data-driven CPS, but they are not su cient. Speci cally, the cyber defenses are insu cient for defending against cyber-physical a acks (e.g., GPS spoo ng [26] ) where a sensing environment can be maliciously altered such that correctly functioning sensors and systems can act erroneously. ese challenges are compounded in dynamic applications (e.g., autonomous driving and closed-loop physiological control) where accurate physical models, commonly required for fault tolerant systems, are challenging to obtain. Moreover, adversarial learning literature (e.g., [9, 17, 19] ) usually assumes a known a acker behavior and/or goal -which is likely unknown in complex CPS applications. Due to the shortcomings of traditional approaches for securing the training data of data-driven CPS, it is necessary to consider techniques for resilient machine learning that can defend against cyber-physical a acks and make minimal assumptions on environments and a ackers.
Towards the ultimate goal of a ack-resilient machine learning, we propose a resilience metric for the analysis and design of learning algorithms under cyber-physical a acks. e metric aims to quantify the resilience of learning algorithms for analysis, which in turn contributes to designing resilient learning algorithms. Specically, this work considers binary linear classi cation algorithms in the presence of maliciously tampered training data. Binary linear classi cation represents a basic building block for more complex classi cation approaches, such as neural network, decision trees, and boosting; thus, developing a ack resilient linear classi ers can lead to more advance resilient machine learning algorithms. To analyze binary classi ers in the presence of training data a acks, we introduce a generic measure of resilience for classi cation in terms of worst-case errors.
Based on the resilience metric, traditional linear classi cation algorithms are evaluated. First, we prove the maximal resilience of any linear classi cation algorithm, which provides an upper bound of a resilience condition that can be achievable. en, we prove that convex loss linear classi cation algorithms, such as SVMs, and 0-1 loss linear classi cation algorithm can not achieve maximal resilience. Based on these results, we introduce a majority 0-1 loss linear classi cation algorithm that is strictly more resilient than the traditional approaches and achieves the maximal resilience condition.
Finally, we evaluate the di erent classi cation algorithms, in the presence of a acks, on a synthetic dataset and a medical case-study, introduced in [24] , to design a detector for arrhythmia (i.e., irregular heart beat). e evaluation on synthetic data illustrates conditions when the di erent algorithms are (and are not) resilient, while the arrhythmia dataset serves to illustrate resilient binary classi cation in a real-world data-driven medical CPS (described in Section 7) .
In summary, the contributions of this work include: (i) introducing, to our knowledge, the rst assessment metric for analyzing binary classi er resilience; (ii) providing an analysis of the resilience of traditional binary classi cation techniques illustrating their shortcomings; (iii) describing a resilient classi cation approach that provides maximal resilience; (iv) evaluating in a retrospective real-world arrhythmia classi cation case-study. e following section describes the work most closely related to the resilient classi cation problem considered herein. In Section 3, we de ne a acker capabilities and a resilience metric. In Section 4, the resilient classi cation problem is formally de ned while an analysis of traditional linear classi cation algorithms is provided in Section 5. In Section 6, a new resilient linear classi cation algorithm is proposed which achieves maximal resilience for the a acker's capabilities considered. Section 7 illustrates the theoretical results using case studies on synthetic and medical data. e nal section provides conclusions with discussion about countermeasures and future work.
RELATED WORK
is section presents the related works for CPS security (Section 2.1) and traditional error/a ack models in the machine learning literature (Section 2.2).
CPS security
ough the security of learning systems for data-driven CPS has been an a erthought, the security of CPS has seen much e ort in the past decade. A mathematical framework considering a acks on CPS is proposed in [10, 41] . e necessary and su cient conditions on CPS with a failure detector such that a stealthy a acker can destabilize the system are provided in [35] . State estimation for an electric power system is analyzed in [47] assuming a ackers know a partial model of the true system. Resilient state estimators for CPS that tolerate a bounded number of sensors and/or actuators a acks are considered in [18, 38] . In mobility-as-a-Service systems (e.g., ride-sharing services), it has been demonstrated that a fraction of cars are maliciously called by fake reservation for denial-of-service [52] . Surgical tele-operated robotic systems can be a ected by denial-of-service a acks on communication channels [8] . Energy management systems, especially when connected to building networks, are vulnerable to cyber a acks that impact on the systems operation. is vulnerability can be a enuated by applying resilient policy when a acks are detected [39] . While there has been much recent work on CPS security, these approaches are (in general) not directly applicable to data-driven CPS.
Learning with Errors
In this subsection, we review the literature on learning in the presence of training data errors most closely related to our work, where a more complete survey of the entire literature can be found in [22, 36] . e error models can be categorized as either label errors or feature errors in Table 1 , according to their classical de nitions [22, 36] . Under each error model, the performance of a learning algorithm is analyzed against whether it achieves a desired classi er. label errors class-independent (CICE) [4] class-dependent (CDCE) [36] feature errors uniform random (URAE) [44] product random (PRAE) [22] malicious errors (ME) [28] When labels in training data are corrupted, the training data is said to have label errors, which can be divided into two subtypes: class-independent classi cation errors (CICE) [4] and classdependent classi cation errors (CDCE) [36] . e class-independent classi cation error model assumes the error probability of positive and negative labels are same while the class-dependent classi cation error model allows the di erent error probability for positive and negative labels.
When features in the training data are corrupted, the training data is said to have feature errors, which can be divided into three subtypes: uniform random a ribute errors [44] , product random a ribute errors [22] , and malicious errors [28] . Both the uniform random a ribute error (URAE) and the product random a ribute error (PRAE) models assume errors on features (i.e., columns of the feature matrix), where URAE assumes the same error probability for all features and PRAE allows for variable error probabilities. From a CPS perspective, a acks on individual features require that each column of the feature matrix corresponds to a single a ack surface (e.g., a single sensor) -which restricts the use of multiple sensors in a single feature, as common in data-driven CPS [12, 25] . Di erent from URAE and PRAE, the malicious error (ME) model assumes arbitrary a acks on feature vectors (i.e., rows of the feature matrix). However, the ME model assumes the probabilities of a acking the feature vectors corresponding to positive and negative labels are the same -a condition which may not be satis ed by savvy a ackers. In contrast to this, our error (or a ack) model assumes the probabilities can be di erent.
SETUP FOR RESILIENT BINARY CLASSIFICATION
is section introduces essential de nitions that are the bases for describing resilient binary classi cation problem. In the following subsections, we present a traditional binary linear classi cation problem (Section 3.1), de ne our a acker assumptions (Section 3.2), and introduce a resilience metric (Section 3.3).
Notationally, we write R, R + 0 , N 0 and [a, b] to denote the set of real numbers, non-negative real numbers, non-negative integers, and integers from a to b, respectively. We write 1 as the ones vector of an appropriate size and | · | to denote the cardinality (i.e., number of elements) of a nite set. e sign function is wri en as sign : R → {+1, −1} and 1{·} corresponds to the indicator function that maps true and false to 1 and 0. Additionally, we write 01 to denote a 0-1 loss function, such that 01 ( i , h(x i )) = 1 i sign(h(x i )) . Lastly, · 1 and · ∞ denotes the 1-norm and the ∞-norm, respectively. See Table 2 for the glossary of mathematical notations in this paper.
Traditional Binary Classi cation
We begin by considering the traditional problem of binary classication in the absence of a acks (or errors). Namely, we consider un-a acked training dataD = {(
where N is the number of training data pairs,D = {D ⊂ X × Y | |D| = N } is a class of training data with N pairs, X ⊆ R p corresponds to a set of feature vectors (or a ributes), Y = {−1, +1} denotes the set of labels (or classes), and each element of x i is called a feature. In a traditional (binary) classi cation problem, such as [50] , given training data, a designer speci es a set of (real-valued) classi ers H ⊆ R X , and a loss function : Y ×R → R + 0 , to learn a (real-valued) classi er h ∈ H , according to
where W ∈ R 2×2 is the diagonal matrix with the positive risk weight w + and the negative risk weight w − on the diagonal, and zeros elsewhere.R (h|D) ∈ R 2 denotes the bi-dimensional vector of empirical risks corresponding to the positive and negative training data. Speci cally, we writeR (h|D) = R (h|D + )R (h|D − ) ,
is the normalized empirical risk evaluated over the training data andD + andD − corresponds to the mutually exclusive sets of positive and negative training data pairs, respectively, such thatD =D + ∪D − . We note that we use Table 2 : e glossary of mathematical notations.
Equation (1) for distinguishing empirical risks over positive and negative training data, but it is equivalent to the standard notation [50] if w + = |D + | and w − = |D − |, and we assume the standard notion in this paper. Also, we callĥ a classi er (i.e.,ĥ ∈ Y X ) or a real-valued classi er (i.e.,ĥ ∈ R X ), interchangeably, assuming the composition of a sign function and a real-valued classi er (i.e., sign •ĥ ∈ Y X ) is a classi er. Moreover, we say N is the number of training data pairs or N = (|D + |, |D − |), interchangeably.
In this paper, we consider a set of classi cation algorithms P F , S , where F is a set of classi ers and S is the set of monotonically nonincreasing functions that are lower-bounded by a 0-1 loss function. Speci cally, the loss function
ϕ is a monotonically non-increasing function, and lim t →∞ ϕ (t ) = c for some scalar c < 1. We note that these assumptions generalize a convex loss [5] to cover a non-convex loss.
Each algorithm in P F , S is a map from a class of training datâ D to a subset of F that uses a loss function in S (i.e., P F , S = {P F, |F ⊆ F , ∈ S}).
us, empirical risk minimization (Equation (1)) for any hypothesis space H ⊆ F and a loss function ∈ S is also a classi cation algorithm considered here (i.e., P H, ∈ P F , S ).
Attacker Capabilities
In this work, we introduce a new class of an a ack based on the number of training data elements the a acker can manipulate, referenced to as a bounded feature a ack (BFA). Speci cally, in this class of an a ack, we assume the a acker has the following three capabilities; (i) e a acker knows the classi cation algorithm to be a acked, (ii) the a acker has unbounded computing power, (iii) the a acker knows all the training data (both before and a er tampering), and (iv) the a acker can tamper the training data. However, the ability to tamper the training data is limited such that the tampered training dataD α di ers from the original training dataD by a nite number of elements. We parameterize the tampered training data using an a acker capability parameter
such that at most α + and α − number of positive and negative feature vectors are maliciously manipulated, respectively. Formally, the α-bounded feature a ack is de ned as follows:
De nition 1 (bounded feature a ack). Given P H, ,D, and α, thenD α is a bounded feature a ack (BFA) ifD α ∈D satis es the following two conditions:
Additionally, letD α be the set of all suchD α (i.e.,D α ∈D α ⊆D).
We emphasize that De nition 1 only speci es what an a acker can do and which information can be used -but does not indicate how the a acker changes the data. is de nition is consistent with the a acker capability de nition used in the CPS security literature (e.g., [18, 38] ). Moreover, α is unknown in general, so algorithms considered in this paper do not assume anything on α. e BFA represents a practical model of a acker capabilities. For example, assume several devices collect medical data and store it in the hospitals central data center. An a acker can exploit known vulnerabilities of the enterprise system of the data center to gain read access on all data (i.e., knows all data), but can only alter data from speci c devices having a certain vulnerabilities (i.e., a acks some of the data). Here, we assume obtaining write access is more di cult than obtaining read access.
In comparison to other a ack models discussed in Section 2, we emphasize that the proposed a acker capabilities are quite general; we only limit the number of tampered feature vectors. By de nition, the BFA includes the ME; moreover, the BFA can represent a acks on (maliciously) manipulating labels in training data.
is is achieved by manipulating a positive feature vector into one of the negative feature vectors, which e ectively switches the label from positive to negative and suggests the BFA includes the CICE and CDCE models.
Resilience Metric
To evaluate a classi cation algorithm in the presence of a BFA, we aim to quantify the e ect of a BFA on the learned classi er's worstcase error metric over all training data and all possible a acks. In traditional detection and classi cation theory, the true-positive and true-negative rates (or the corresponding false-positive and falsenegative rates) are commonly used to evaluate the performance of a classi er. We introduce a generic metric that utilizes the falsepositive and false-negative rates such that it measures the worstcase weighted p-norm of the two error rates over all training data and all feasible a acks, de ned as follows:
De nition 2 (resilience metric). Given N and α, the resilience of P H, is quanti ed as the worst-case weighted p-norm of error rates over allD ∈D andD α ∈D α , stated as
is resilience metric measures the performance of a classi cation algorithm (i.e., V W ,p (·)) in the presence of the worst-cast a ack given the a acker capability parameter α.
In this work, we select w + = w − = 1 and p = ∞. So, V W ,p (·) ranges from zero to one and equals one if P H, outputs any classi er such that an a ack could result in mis-classi cation of all the positive or negative feature vectors in the un-a acked training dataD. For notational simplicity, we denote V W ,p (·) as V (·). Our selection of w + = w − = 1 means each label is equally important to model the unknown a acker's preference for each label. e choice of p = ∞ is motivated by the worst-case classi cation approach that minimizes the maximum of class-conditional error rates [31] .
We note that other norm measures could have been chosen rather than the ∞-norm. For instance, selecting p = 1 results in evaluating the 1-norm of the false-positive and false-negative rates, where V (·) ≥ 1 implies that the classi er is at least as bad as a weighted coin-ip (i.e., a trivial classi er) [49] . Additionally, selecting p = 2 speci es V (·) to be the Euclidean distance to the classi er error of zero. In general, the selection of p in Equation (3) can vary based upon the security concerns.
Applying the resilience metric in Equation (3), a binary classication algorithm P H, can be evaluated for given N and α. Furthermore, the resilience metric can be upper bounded by a function in N and α, i.e., (N , α ) :
where G is the set of all such . en, the upper bound characterizes the property of an algorithm over various a ack parameters. In this case, the classication algorithm is called a (N , α )-resilient algorithm. Formally, we de ne the resilience property of a classi cation algorithm in the context of this work as follows.
where ∈ G denotes the worst-case resilience bound.
is worst-case resilience bound plays a key role in de ning resilient binary classi cation problem, which is de ned in the following section.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
is section formulates the problem of analyzing (and ultimately designing) resilient binary classi cation algorithms with respect to training data a acks. Speci cally, given the number of positive and negative training data N , a set of classi ers F , a set of loss functions S, and a class of algorithms P F , S , the goal of this paper is nding a classi cation algorithm P and a resilience bound that minimize the error of the resilience bound such that P is (N , α )resilient to a BFA. Here, to measure the error of the resilience bound we use the number of α that makes the resilience bound maximum (i.e., α ∈Θ 1{ (N , α ) = 1}), but any other error measure can be used. In short, a resilient binary classi cation problem is de ned as follows: P (BFA ). Given N , F , S, and P F , S , a BFA resilient binary classi cation problem is to nd a classi cation algorithm P ∈ P F , S and a resilience bound ∈ G according to
We note several implications of the above problem. First, a feasible classi cation algorithm of this problem guarantees the worst-case performance characterized by since the constraint of the problem enforces that the worst-case error (i.e., V (·)) is bounded by for all possible a acks (i.e., ∀α). Next, the problem can consider the capabilities of classi cation algorithms by encoding prior knowledge on the class of classi cation algorithms P F , S . Speci cally, P F , S can be the class of classi cation algorithms that uses empirical risk minimization over F with convex loss functions. e resilient classi cation problem then nds a classi cation algorithm in the restricted class of P F , S . We note that when choosing the restricted class of classi cation algorithms in this paper, we do not consider the a acker capability parameter α, implying we focus on nding an algorithm without assumptions on α. en, the ultimate goal of the resilient binary classi cation problem is making (·) ≤ ϵ for some N and for all α given conditions on P F , S , where ϵ is a su ciently small scalar. Finally, we note that the resilience binary classi cation problem is related to the problem of minimizing generalization error of a classi er considered in traditional classi cation (See Section 1 in [40] ). We note that in this paper a BFA resilient binary classi cation problem is simply called a resilient binary classi cation problem assuming a BFA as an a ack model. P denotes the optimal of the resilient binary classi cation problem to explicitly represent the dependency on P. Also, an algorithm A is more resilient than an
and A, B, A , and B satisfy the constraint in the problem (Equation (6)). In the following section, we utilize the de nition of the resilient binary classi cation problem to analyze traditional linear classi cation algorithms for resilience under a BFA.
RESILIENCE OF TRADITIONAL LINEAR CLASSIFICATION
Traditional classi cation algorithms (e.g. SVMs or 0-1 loss linear classi cation) rarely consider a learning environment that is partially controlled by a ackers. Here, we focus on linear classi cation algorithms (i.e., F = L, where L is the set of linear functions), which is a basic building block for more complex classi cation algorithms. In this section, we analyze whether traditional linear classi cation algorithms are resilient. First, linear classi cation algorithms with various convex loss functions are analyzed (Section 5.1). Next, a linear classi cation algorithm with a 0-1 loss function is analyzed (Section 5.2).
In the following, we strictly consider un-a acked training datâ D for which a perfect classi er exists -i.e., for some h ∈ H , W · R (h|D) 1 = 0 -such that only errors are introduced by a acks. We note that, in practice, the empirical risk over training data is rarely equal to zero due to errors from noise and an assumption on H . However, by treating errors as a acks, the theoretical results in the following sections can be interpreted as assuming worst-case errorse.g., a acks. e resilient binary classi cation problem nds a classi cation algorithm P and a resilience bound P , but the resilience bound may be trivial for some α, i.e., (N , α ) = 1. us, it is worthwhile to nd a resilience a ack condition, A P ⊆ Θ, such that (N , α ) is non-trivial for all α ∈ A P . In this case, we say that P is resilient w.r.t. A P .
De nition 4 (resilient w.r.t. A P ). Given N , P, P , and A P , a classi cation algorithm P is resilient w.r.t A P if the algorithm is (N , α )-resilient to a BFA and (N , α ) < 1 for all α ∈ A P .
Here, we emphasize that nding an a ack condition on α that makes a classi cation algorithm 1-resilient to a BFA (i.e., nding some set B P such that B P ⊆ A c P ) is equally important to nding the resilience a ack condition A P since α ∈ B P can be a "breaking point" of the algorithm P. We refer to B P as the perfectly a ackable condition of P. us, we introduce a new notion, perfectly a ackable w.r.t B P , which is formally described as follows:
De nition 5 (perfectly a ackable w.r.t. B P ). Given N , P, and B P , a classi cation algorithm P is perfectly a ackable w.r.t B P if the algorithm is 1-resilient to a BFA for all α ∈ B P .
Next, we introduce a maximal resilience a ack conditionĀ ⊆ Θ. It is a resilience a ack condition of some linear classi cation algorithm or a combination of algorithms where the size of the condition is maximal. Formally, De nition 6 (maximally resilient condition).Ā is a maximal resilient condition ifĀ = ∪ ∈S A P L, .
We note that if the resilience a ack condition A P of a classi cation algorithm P is same asĀ, we say that P is maximally resilient. To nd the maximal resilience a ack conditionĀ, we consider some superset of it (i.e.,B c such thatĀ ⊆B c ), which is a theoretical upper bound of the maximal resilience a ack condition. We argue that there exists some classi cation algorithm that achieves the a ack conditionB c . is then impliesB c is the maximal resilience a ack condition (See eorem 2).
One example ofB can be some subset of ∩ ∈S B P L, due tō
e following theorems formally stateB and a condition whenB c is the maximal resilience a ack condition. T 1. Given |D + | and |D − |, letB be
For all ∈ S, P L, is perfectly a ackable w.r.t.B.
. For all N , α ∈B, and ∈ S, we nd someD andD α where V (P L, (D α )|N , α ) = 1. See Section 2.2.1 in [40] for details. T 2. If there exists P ∈ P L, S such that A P =B c , then B c is the maximal resilience a ack condition.
. We use the following two set relations to provē A =B c : (1)Ā ⊆B c = A P and (2) A P ⊆Ā. See Section 2.2.2 in [40] for details. e intuitive interpretation ofB is that if the number of tampered positive or negative feature vectors is greater than or equal to the half of |D + | or |D − |, respectively, then any linear classi cation algorithm trained with this training data can be perfectly a ackable w.r.t.B. We note that in Section 6 we showB is actually the maximal resilience a ack condition. us, we assume this from now on. In the following subsections, we show that two classical approaches do not achieve the maximal resilience: (i) convex loss linear classi cation; and (ii) 0-1 loss linear classi cation.
Convex Loss Linear Classi cation
In this section, the class of convex-loss linear classi cation algorithms is considered, where it is the collection of P L, c ∈ P L, S , where c is any convex relaxation of a 0-1 loss function, such as a hinge loss function. SVMs and a maximum likelihood learning of logistic regression belong to this class. We prove that any algorithm in this class is perfectly a ackable w.r.t. some a ack condition where an a acker can tamper at least one feature vector. Let B P L, c be the a ack condition for the convex-loss linear classi cation algorithms being perfectly a ackable, and then the a ack condition is formally stated as follows: P 1. Let B P L, c be the set of α that satis es one of the following two conditions: . e idea of "perfectly a ackable" proof is that for all N and α ∈ B P L, c we nd someD andD α where V (P L, c (D α ) |N , α ) = 1. e "resilient" proof is trivial. See Section 2.2.3 in [40] for details. is implies even though an a acker has weak ability to tamper training data, it can make the algorithm misclassify all positive or all negative feature vectors of un-a acked training data by tampering only one positive or negative feature vector (See Figure 1a for the visualization of the perfectly a ackable condition on α). For example, data-driven CPS that use SVMs to train intrusion detectors [39] can be vulnerable if an a acker can tamper at least one feature vector. We note that convex-loss linear classi cation algorithms are not maximally resilient since B c P L, c ⊂B c .
0-1 Loss Linear Classi cation
A 0-1 loss linear classi cation algorithm is de ned as P L, 01 ∈ P L, S , where 01 (·) is a 0-1 loss function. We prove that the 0-1 loss linear classi cation algorithm is perfectly a ackable w.r.t. some attack condition where the number of tampered positive or negative feature vectors is greater than or equal to the half of |D + | or |D − |, respectively, or the sum of the number of tampered positive feature vectors and the number of tampered negative feature vectors is greater than or equal to |D − | or |D + |. Let B P L, 01 be the a ack condition for the 0-1 loss linear classi cation algorithm being perfectly a ackable, and then the a ack condition is formally stated as follows:
Given |D + | and |D − |, let B P L, 01 be the set of α that satis es one of the following four conditions:
en, P L, 01 is perfectly a ackable w.r.t. B P L, 01 .
. For all N and α ∈ B P L, 01 we nd someD and
is proposition implies the 0-1 loss linear classi cation is strictly more resilient than convex one (See Figure 1b for comparison) .
us, di erent to the convex case, tampering single feature vector is not critical for the 0-1 loss linear classi cation.
is means any CPS using convex linear classi cation algorithms [12, 39, 42] can be converted into the 0-1 linear classi cation algorithm to defend against the single feature vector tampering; however, neither approach can provide maximal resilience due to B c P L, 01 ⊂B c .
RESILIENT LINEAR CLASSIFICATION
In this section, we propose a maximally resilient linear classi cation algorithm. A majority 0-1 loss linear classi cation is de ned as P M, 01 ∈ P L, S , where M denotes a majority constraint that restricts a feasible set of classi ers by only allowing a classi er that correctly classi es at least half of positive and negative feature vectors, according to
In the following subsections, the resilience proof and the worst-case resilience bound of the majority 0-1 classi cation are provided.
Resilience of Majority 0-1 Loss Linear
Classi cation e majority 0-1 loss linear classi cation is perfectly a ackable w.r.t. some a ack condition where an a acker can manipulate greater than or equal to the half of |D + | or |D − |. Let B P M, 01 be the a ack condition for the majority 0-1-loss linear classi cation algorithms being perfectly a ackable, and then the a ack condition is formally stated as follows:
Given |D + | and |D − |, let B P M, 01 be . . e ideal of "perfectly a ackable" proof is that for all N and α ∈ B P M, 01 we nd someD andD α where V (P M, 01 (D α )|N , α ) = 1. For the "resilient" proof, we exploit the property of the majority constraint. See Section 2.2.5 in [40] for details.
is result shows that the majority 0-1 loss linear classi cation algorithm is more resilient than traditional linear classi cation algorithms, which is also illustrated in Figure 1c . Furthermore, it achieves the maximal resilience condition ( eorem 1) due to B P M, 01 =B, showing this algorithm achieves the maximal resilience a ack condition.
Robustness of Resilient Classi cation
If a classi cation algorithm is resilient, it is worth analyzing the degree of resilience. If α ∈ A P M, 01 , where A P M, 01 = B c P M, 01 , then the worst-case resilience bound of the majority 0-1 loss classi cation algorithm is nearly proportional to the tampering ability of an a acker, which is formally stated as follows:
Given |D + |, |D − |, and α ∈ A P M, 01 , the resilience bound of P M, 01 can be computed as follows:
. To prove V (·) is bounded by (·) for all N and α ∈ A P M, 01 , we exploit the optimality condition of an optimal classi er P M, 01 (D α ) and the property of the majority constraint. To prove that the bound is tight for all N and α ∈ A P M, 01 , we nd someD andD α where V (·) = (·). See Section 2.2.6 in [40] for details.
is theorem shows that if α ∈ A P M, 01 , the resilience bound is nontrivial. Also, it shows that even if the a acker capability parameter α is restricted (i.e., α ∈ A P M, 01 ) to ensure that the algorithm is resilient w.r.t. A P M, 01 , the tampered portion of training data still a ects on the accuracy of the algorithm. Finally, we note that the resilience bound is tight.
CASE STUDY
In this section, we validate the proven resilience of algorithms experimentally.
alitative results on synthetic data are presented in Figure 3 and results on a real-world retrospective arrhythmia data are shown in Table 3 . e majority 0-1 loss linear classi cation algorithm is formulated in the following mixed integer linear program (MILP). where (x i , i ) is an ith training data pair, h ∈ R p is a real-valued classi er, e ∈ R |D α | denotes a scaled classi cation error, z ∈ {0, 1} |D α | is a vector that indicates misclassi cation of each training data pair, λ is a regularization constant, set to zero, and δ is a su ciently large positive constant, where δ = 10 3 . 1 + and 1 − represent vectors where a jth element is lled with one if j = +1 and j = −1, respectively, and zeros elsewhere. We note that the 0-1 loss linear classi cation algorithm is formulated in the same way to the above MILP except for the last two constraints (See Section 3 in [40] ), related to the majority constraint, and we adopt a standard SVMs formulation [15] without a regularization term for fair comparison. eoretically, the performance of the 0-1 loss linear classi cation algorithm is as good as that of the convex loss linear classi cation algorithms [5] . If there are no a ack and no error, the 0-1 loss linear classi cation algorithm is same as the majority 0-1 loss linear classi cation algorithm since the last two constraints of MILP are not activated if there are no a acks and no error.
In experiments, we consider two types of a acks: a point a ack and an overlap a ack, which are concrete instances of a BFA. e point a ack is an a ack that manipulates a single feature vector to be located far from the training data as illustrated in Figure 3 . e a acked single feature vector is chosen and tampered as follows. Let α + = 1, andx + andx − be the mean of positive and negative feature vectors, respectively. Any positive feature vector is chosen and replaced to a scaled vector σx where the scaled vector is on the half-line fromx + to the direction ofx − −x + , and the scale value σ is a su ciently large scalar. e overlap a ack is an a ack that manipulates positive and/or negative feature vectors to be overlapped negative and/or positive feature vectors, respectively, as illustrated in Figure 3 . e overlap a ack is brie y described as follows: when α = (α + , α − ), α + and α − number of positive and negative feature vectors are randomly chosen for tampering, respectively. e chosen positive and negative feature vectors are randomly overlapped to negative and positive un-a acked feature vectors, respectively. ese steps are repeated until a target classi cation algorithm achieves a maximum desired resilience value V (·).
Synthetic data. In Figure 3 , the classi cation results of each linear classi cation algorithm, such as SVMs, the 0-1 loss linear classi cation, and the majority 0-1 loss linear classi cation, are illustrated with di erent types of an a ack. e original training data without a acks is randomly drawn from two Gaussian distributions, as illustrated in the rst column and the rst row, where |D + | = 20 and |D − | = 80. When there is no a ack (the rst row in Figure 3 ), all three algorithms correctly classify training data. If there is a point a ack (the second row in Figure 3 1.0 1.0 0.5946 Table 3 : e resilience metric V (·) of each linear classication algorithm for Arrhythmia detection [24] under the speci ed attacks. that misclassi es all positive feature vectors of un-a acked training data. When an overlap a ack (the third row in Figure 3 ) is applied, where α − = 24, both SVMs and the 0-1 loss linear classi cation output classi ers that misclassi es all positive feature vectors of un-a acked training data while the majority 0-1 loss classi cation algorithm still correctly classi es the portion of the positive feature vectors of un-a acked training data, showing that the majority 0-1 loss classi cation algorithm is more resilient than others.
Moreover, using the synthetic data, the theoretical worst-case resilience bound (Equation (12)) of the majority 0-1 loss linear classi cation is experimentally shown in Figure 4 . e blue line represents the theoretical worst-case resilience bound. Red points are the resilience V (·) over the corresponding α. Speci cally, 100 di erentD are randomly generated, whereD + andD − are drawn from two Gaussian distributions of positive and negative labels, respectively. For eachD and for each α + , which ranges from 0 to the total number of positive feature vectors, an a acker moves α + number of positive feature vectors beyond the negative features in 100 di erent ways to obtainD α so that positive and negative feature vectors cannot be linearly separable. By taking the maximum of V (·) for 100 di erentD and 100 di erentD α , the resilience V (·)
is obtained for each α + , which is represented in a red cross. In Figure 4 , the red crosses do not excess the theoretical bound and the increasing trend follows the bound.
Medical data. We evaluated the resilience of traditional linear classi cation algorithms and the proposed algorithm using arrhythmia dataset. e arrhythmia, a.k.a irregular heartbeat, is a condition of the heart in which the heartbeat is irregular. An arrhythmia detector cooperated with logs from pacemaker can reduce stroke and death rate [21] . To design such a detector, electrocardiogram (ECG) training data can be collected from logs of the pacemaker (Figure 2) whether ECG data is normal or abnormal (e.g., atrial brillation or sinus tachycardia). But, if the pacemaker is vulnerable, the training data can be tampered to hinder to detect arrhythmia, possibly leading to death.
In Table 3 , we have compared the resilience V (·) of each algorithm on real medical dataset. Arrhythmia dataset [24] , which can be found at the UCI machine learning repository [32] , is used for evaluating the resilience of each algorithm. e Arrhythmia dataset is preprocessed as follows. Due to the computational limitation to solve the MILP, we use 20 percent of training data (i.e., |D + | = 37 and |D − | = 49) and select features from 40th and 99th for training classi ers. We've obtained the same results as illustrated with synthetic data. SVMs algorithm outputs a classi er that misclassi es all positive or negative feature vectors under both a point a ack and an overlap a ack. 0-1 loss linear classi cation does not a ect on a point a ack but outputs a classi er that misclassi es all positive or negative feature vectors when an overlap a ack is applied by tampering 43.2 and 42.8 percent of positive and negative feature vector, respectively. However, the majority 0-1 loss linear classi cation still correctly classi es the portion of positive and negative feature vectors even though about 43 percent of training data were tampered. We emphasize that V (·) values in Table 3 are not prediction results, but they are evaluated over training data, making V (·) = 0 possible. However, a higher V (·) value implies higher prediction error.
Comparison with [28] . Kearns and Li's paper [28] analyzes a binary classi cation problem under the malicious error (ME) model, but our paper analyzes a binary linear classi cation problem under a BFA, which is a general case of the ME model. Here, we compare each paper's result by providing an example. Assume a binary linear classi cation problem under the ME model, where |D + | = |D − | = 50 and α + = α − = 10. Kearns and Li's paper states that if a designer wants to have the expected accuracy of 0.9, then
1+0.1 ≈ 0.091 regardless of a classi cation algorithm. is means at most 0.091 percent of training data can be tampered to guarantee the expected accuracy. However, this does not state anything on the expected accuracy when α + |D + | ≥ 0.091. In comparison to this, our paper implies that, in the case of the majority 0-1 linear classi cation algorithm, (|D|, (α + , α − )) = 0.6. is means that a designer can expect the accuracy on training data that is at least 1 − 0.6 = 0.4. is further implies the expected minimum accuracy can be approximately 0.4 when α + |D + | = 0.2 ≥ 0.091. We note that the connection between the accuracy on training data (i.e., the performance measure of this paper) and the expected accuracy (i.e., the performance measure of traditional classi cation) can be found in Section 1 in [40] .
CONCLUSIONS
In particularly, the incorrect decisions on CPS directly a ect on a physical environment, so learning techniques under training data a acks should be scrutinized. Toward the goal of resilient machine learning, we propose a resilience metric for the analysis and design of a resilient classi cation algorithm under training data a acks. Traditional algorithms, such as convex loss linear classi cation algorithms and the 0-1 loss linear classi cation algorithm, are proved to be resilient under restricted conditions. However, the proposed 0-1 loss linear classi cation with a majority constraint is more resilient than others, and it is the maximally resilient algorithm among linear classi cation algorithms. e worst-case resilience bound of the proposed algorithm is then provided, suggesting how resilient the algorithm is under training data a acks.
Countermeasures. e resilience analysis on di erent linear classi cation algorithms provides us clues for countermeasures on training data a acks. Here, we brie y discuss a possible direction for countermeasures and its challenges. In general, additional algorithms can be considered to eliminate the worst-case situations in the analysis of each classi cation algorithm. For example, to defend against the point a ack on SVMs, it might be considered to add a preprocessing step that saturates large values in training data. Speci cally, if a designer knows the minimum and maximum range of features, then range can saturate the large values that contribute to the point a ack. However, this might not be an e ective countermeasure since the range of features is not known in general and the point a ack can be conducted a er the preprocessing step, not before it.
Here, we emphasize that our analysis, which is purposely focused on a classi cation algorithm exclusively, helps to devise countermeasures: combining a classi cation algorithm with a preprocessing step or using a complex classi cation algorithm (e.g., hierarchical approach and neural networks). We believe that the advanced algorithms work be er under the training data a ack in general and our analysis on the simple algorithms (e.g., SVMs) can be a building block for analyzing and devising advanced algorithms.
Future works. As a future work, the following issues are worth being considered. A more practical mixed integer linear program can speed up computational time (e.g., [37] ) and it would be promising to design and analyze multiple algorithms in tandem (one to monitor the data, one to learn a classi er). It is also worth incorporating bounded noise error and designing error on H in analysis, and extending to non-linear and multiclass classi cation problem. Finally, to devise countermeasures, it would be promising to consider resilient algorithms that estimate a acker capabilities or model prior knowledge on a ackers.
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